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THE CONSTITUTIONAL BATTLE 
OVER THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
LITIGANT EXCEPTION TO RULE 82 
Attorney fee-shifting laws arouse a great deal of contention in Ameri-
can legal debates because they aim to answer the difficult question of 
who should pay the cost of litigation.  Lawmakers are constantly re-
examining this issue, recognizing that civil litigation is costly and the 
high price for legal services often determines whether a party will use 
the courts to settle his or her grievances.  This is no less true in 
Alaska, the only state in America with a general “loser pays” attor-
ney fee-shifting system for most civil litigation.  This Note addresses 
the current dilemma that Alaska faces regarding attorney’s fees 
awards in public interest litigation.  The author begins by examining 
the development of the common law public interest litigant doctrine 
and the substantive revisions to Rule 82 of the Alaska Rules of Civil 
Procedure made by the Alaska Supreme Court in 1993.  Next, he dis-
cusses recent legislative attempts to repeal the doctrine, which 
prompted a constitutional challenge in Native Village of Nunapitchuk 
v. State, a case likely to be appealed to the Supreme Court of Alaska.  
The author then analyzes the legal issues raised in the Nunapitchuk 
decision and argues for affirmation if appealed.  Finally, the author 
concludes by suggesting what substantive revisions to the public in-
terest litigant doctrine should be considered and how they should be 
made within the purview of the Alaska Constitution. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Alaska has a unique and complex attorney fee-shifting regime that 
awards partial fees in a two-way fee-shifting system to both prevailing 
plaintiffs and defendants. 1  Unlike most states, where fee-shifting exists 
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 1. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82.  Alaska’s attorney’s fees laws have a long history dating 
back to the state’s territorial days.  ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ALASKA’S ENGLISH 
RULE: ATTORNEY’S FEE-SHIFTING IN CIVIL CASES 29–30 (1995).  For many years prior to 
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only in limited statutorily-mandated circumstances,2 Alaska’s attorney 
fee-shifting system is codified in the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure as 
Rule 82.  Specifically, Rule 82 provides that prevailing parties in a civil 
case may recover attorney’s fees pursuant to an established schedule 
based either on the monetary judgment award or on a percentage of rea-
sonable attorney’s fees incurred when no money award is recovered.3  
The Rule provides discretion for the court to deviate from this fee 
schedule upon consideration of a variety of factors.4 
In general, two-way fee-shifting systems such as Alaska’s are 
lauded for encouraging meritorious claims and discouraging nuisance 
claims.5  However, two-way fee-shifting regimes have disincentive ef-
fects beyond merely discouraging non-meritorious claims.6  Middle- and 
lower-income individuals may be effectively deterred from pursuing 
promising claims because of the threat of having to pay their opponent’s 
attorney’s fees.7  Given the uncertainty of litigation, the opportunity cost 
of litigating claims, even ones with strong public interest implications, 
may be too high to justify the potential loss of limited disposable in-
come.8  To accommodate these competing interests, the Alaska courts 
developed a common law exception to the attorney fee-shifting rule for 
public interest litigants and made substantive revisions to Rule 82 to 
maintain the courts’ discretion to consider these public policy concerns. 
In 2003, the Alaska state legislature passed House Bill 145, which 
altered the attorney fee-shifting exception for public interest cases.9  The 
bill raised important constitutional questions, particularly regarding 
separation of powers.  House Bill 145 limited a court’s discretion to 
modify an attorney’s fees award for equitable considerations based on 
the public interest nature of the case, though it preserved an exception to 
the Rule for claims based on the state or federal constitution.10  In es-
sence, the state legislature substantively amended a disputably proce-
 
statehood, Alaska’s legal system operated under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
but still maintained its fee-shifting regime. Id. at 32–33.  In 1960, the Alaska Supreme 
Court, under its exclusive constitutional authority, promulgated rules of civil procedure 
for the State of Alaska. Id. at 34. Supreme Court Order 5 established Rule 82 in the 
Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure.  Alaska Sup. Ct. Order 5 (1960). 
 2. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, Supra note 1, at 14–15. 
 3. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82 (a)–(b). 
 4. Id. § b(3). 
 5. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee-shifting, 47 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 147 (Winter 1984). 
 6. Id. at 153. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. H.B. 145, 23d Leg., 1st. Sess. (Alaska 2003) (enacted). 
 10. Id. 
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dural rule.  In doing so, it sparked controversy over which branch of 
government has jurisdiction over the public interest litigant doctrine. 
In Native Village of Nunapitchuk v. State,11 a group of organiza-
tions representing several public interest sectors challenged the constitu-
tionality of House Bill 145, arguing, among other things, that the bill 
failed to receive the two-thirds majority required for the legislature to 
amend rules of civil procedure.12  The Nunapitchuk case raised the ques-
tion of whether the public interest litigant doctrine was a procedural rule 
or a substantive law that is subject to legislative revision.13  The Superior 
Court for the State of Alaska struck down the bill, holding that it imper-
missibly attempted to amend a rule of civil procedure.14  The court, 
however, stated that there is no bright line rule regarding the constitu-
tional issues raised,15 an assertion that this Note attempts to disprove.  
While it is uncertain whether this bill will survive judicial review by the 
supreme court, the legislature has made clear that the public interest liti-
gant doctrine needs revision and attempts to amend it will likely persist. 
II.  RELEVANT LAW 
Throughout the history of Rule 82, the courts have had broad dis-
cretion to alter the general rule governing attorney’s fees awards.  The 
original Alaska Civil Rule 82 read, “[u]nless the court, in its discretion, 
otherwise directs, the following schedule of attorney’s fees will be ad-
hered to.”16  The courts exercised this discretion by establishing a com-
mon law exception to Rule 82 for litigants bringing forth good faith 
claims on behalf of the public interest.17  In 1993, the supreme court 
adopted Court Order 1118, adding section b(3) to the Rule, which gave 
the courts explicit discretion to adjust attorney’s fees awards based on 
several factors.18  The following section will discuss the development of 
the public interest litigant exception in the common law and the subse-
quent codification of the exception into the Alaska Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 
A. Common Law History 
The public interest litigant exception to Rule 82 has its roots in the 
common law.  In the early years following statehood, the supreme court 
 
 11. No. 1JU-03-700 CI, slip op. (Alaska Super. Ct. filed Apr. 6, 2004). 
 12. Id. at 1–2. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 2–3. 
 15. Id. at 14–15. 
 16. Alaska Sup. Ct. Order 5 (1960). 
 17. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 73–77. 
 18. Alaska Sup. Ct. Order 1118 (July 15, 1993). 
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recognized the burden that fee-shifting placed on unsuccessful litigants 
bringing good faith claims in the public’s interest.  In Malvo v. J.C. 
Penny Company, Inc.,19 the court outlined several public policy consid-
erations in determining whether to award attorney’s fees.20  In that case, 
parents of a black teenage girl sued a department store for slander and 
false imprisonment related to a mistaken allegation of shoplifting.21  The 
trial court found for the defendants and awarded the department store the 
full amount of attorney’s fees requested under Rule 82.22  The supreme 
court reversed the attorney’s fees award23 and, in doing so, made several 
policy determinations about the discretion that trial courts may exercise 
in awarding attorney’s fees.  Writing for the majority, Justice Boochever 
acknowledged the wide discretion that Rule 82 grants to a trial court, but 
argued that the rule was designed solely for the purpose of providing 
compensation when justified.24  In criticizing the lower court’s granting 
of full attorney’s fees to the department store, Justice Boochever stressed 
the importance of considering the good faith of an unsuccessful litigant’s 
claims and the policy justification for requiring the payment of attor-
ney’s fees.25  He cautioned that failure to consider these policy concerns 
would lead to serious detriment to the judicial system.26  In coming to 
this conclusion, he relied on Boddie v. Connecticut,27 where the United 
States Supreme Court held that “a cost requirement, valid on its face, 
may offend due process because it operates to foreclose a particular 
party’s opportunity to be heard.”28  The Alaska Supreme Court con-
cluded by declaring that the purpose of Rule 82 was to partially compen-
sate successful litigants where attorney’s fees awards are justified, not to 
penalize unsuccessful parties for bringing good faith claims.29 
Justice Boochever’s reasoning in Malvo, however, did not initially 
mark a new wave of deference towards unsuccessful public interest liti-
gants in the determination of attorney’s fees.  A few months later, in Jef-
ferson v. City of Anchorage,30 the supreme court, in an opinion joined by 
Justice Boochever,31 upheld an attorney’s fees award against two tax-
 
 19. 512 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1973). 
 20. Id. at 586–88. 
 21. Id. at 577. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 588. 
 24. Id. at 587. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
 28. Malvo, 512 P.2d at 587 (quoting Boddie, 401 U.S. at 380). 
 29. Id. at 588. 
 30. 513 P.2d 1099 (Alaska 1973). 
 31. Id. at 1100. 
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payers purporting to assert a claim on behalf of a public interest.32  
There, two taxpayers challenged a city ordinance that raised the annual 
salary of the Mayor of Anchorage.33  In upholding the fee award against 
the plaintiffs, the court argued that the public interest would not be 
served by a claim that so clearly lacked validity.34  While acknowledging 
that a more valid claim by the plaintiffs might have altered their holding 
with respect to attorney’s fees, the court did however draw attention to 
precedent where attorney’s fees awards were upheld in spite of public 
interest claims.35 
One year later, in the landmark case of Gilbert v. State,36 the su-
preme court for the first time explicitly established that unsuccessful 
public interest litigants were exempt from paying attorney’s fees.37  In 
that case, a candidate for state senate challenged the constitutionality of 
the residency requirement for those seeking legislative office.38  The su-
perior court had rejected his constitutional claim and awarded attorney’s 
fees to the state.39  The supreme court upheld the decision of the superior 
court on the merits of the case40 but reversed the award of attorney’s 
fees, finding that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attor-
ney’s fees against a losing party who raised a question of genuine public 
interest in good faith before the courts.41  The court derived an express 
exception to the fee-shifting rule from Jefferson, noting that “denial of 
attorney’s fees might be appropriate in a proper case where the public 
interest is involved.”42 
Three years after Gilbert was decided, the court completed the pub-
lic interest exception by deciding that prevailing public interest litigants 
are entitled to full reasonable attorney’s fees.  In Anchorage v. 
McCabe,43 the City of Anchorage appealed an award of full attorney’s 
fees to homeowners who prevailed in a suit against the city over the con-
stitutionality of a zoning ordinance.44  The city argued that the superior 
court abused its discretion in awarding such high fees because, under 
 
 32. Id. at 1102–03. 
 33. Id. at 1100. 
 34. Id. at 1102. 
 35. Id. at 1102–03 (citing Dale v. Greater Anchorage Area Borough, 439 P.2d 790, 
793 (Alaska 1968)). 
 36. 526 P.2d 1131 (Alaska 1974). 
 37. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 74. 
 38. Gilbert, 526 P.2d at 1132. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 1134–36. 
 41. Id. at 1136. 
 42. Id. 
 43. 568 P.2d 986 (Alaska 1977). 
 44. Id. at 988–89. 
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then-established precedent, public interest litigants were not entitled to 
attorney’s fees.45  The city contended that litigants who are relieved from 
the risk of being charged with attorney’s fees if they lose should not 
benefit from the fee-shifting rule if they prevail.46  The city further 
warned that the award to the homeowners would create a slippery slope 
that would “increase the number of public interest suits and encourage 
attempted resolution of political disputes through the judicial process.”47  
The court was unpersuaded by the city’s concerns, as the concerns un-
dermined the policy considerations raised in Gilbert.48 
In establishing a public interest exception to Rule 82, the court rea-
soned that the public interest exception was created to encourage plain-
tiffs to bring good faith public interest claims to the courts and remove 
the financial burden of bringing such suits.49  The court found wide-
spread support for this policy in both federal and state jurisdictions, 
where the law provides exceptions for successful public interest litigants 
to the general American rule that each side is responsible for his or her 
attorney’s fees.50  In these jurisdictions, the public interest litigant serves 
as a “private attorney general” that vindicates a significant legislative 
policy.51  The court determined that if jurisdictions that do not ordinarily 
award attorney’s fees to prevailing parties make an exception for suc-
cessful public interest litigants, then one-way fee-shifting most certainly 
existed in a state where compensation was the rule.52 
The McCabe decision is particularly important for establishing con-
crete criteria for Alaska courts to use when deciding when to invoke the 
public interest exception.  Borrowing from the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of California decision in La Raza Unida 
v. Volpe,53 the court stressed the presence of three factors: “(1) the effec-
tuation of strong public policies; (2) the fact that numerous people re-
ceived benefits from plaintiffs’ litigation success; [and] (3) the fact that 
only a private party could have been expected to bring this action.”54  
Five years later, the supreme court recognized a fourth criterion, namely 
“whether the litigant claiming public interest status would have had suf-
ficient economic incentive to bring the lawsuit even if it involved only 
 
 45. Id. at 989. 
 46. Id. at 989–90. 
 47. Id. at 990. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 990–91. 
 53. 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 
 54. McCabe, 568 P.2d at 991 (quoting La Raza Unida, 57 F.R.D. at 101). 
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narrow issues lacking general importance.”55  The rationale for this addi-
tion is that litigants with substantially greater private interests in a suit 
should not be otherwise deterred from using the courts to bring a good 
faith claim.56  Despite this reasoning however, the supreme court has 
held that plaintiffs are not necessarily precluded from public interest 
status due to their comparatively minor economic interests in the out-
come of their cases so long as the other criteria have been met.57 
B. Rule 82 Revisions 
In 1993, the supreme court dramatically advanced the discretional 
authority of the courts to amend fee awards, adopting Supreme Court 
Order 1118, which repealed and reenacted Rule 82.58  The most signifi-
cant change in the Rule is embodied in Section b(3), which explicitly ar-
ticulates the conditions under which a court may deviate from the fee 
schedule in the Rule.59  The provision conditions the courts’ ability to 
vary the fee award upon consideration of several factors.60  Most rele-
vant to the present issue are subsections I and K, which read as follows: 
The court may vary an attorney’s fee award. . .if, upon consideration 
of the factors below, the court determines a variation is warranted. . . 
(I) the extent to which a given fee award may be so onerous to the 
non-prevailing party that it would deter similarly situated litigants 
from the voluntary use of the courts. . . 
(K) other equitable factors deemed relevant.61 
The revised Rule states that if a court employs one of these exceptions, it 
need only explain its reasons for doing so.62  These sections signify a 
dramatic departure from the original Rule, which required that the pre-
scribed attorney’s fees schedule be adhered to “[u]nless the court, in its 
discretion, otherwise directs.”63  The more detailed provisions of the new 
Rule expounded upon the vague language in the original that served as 
the basis for the common law public interest exception.64  It codified 
 
 55. Kenai Lumber Co., Inc. v. LeResche, 646 P.2d 215, 223 (Alaska 1982). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Anchorage Daily News v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 803 P.2d 402, 404 (Alaska 
1990). 
 58. Alaska Sup. Ct. Order 1118 (July 15, 1993). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Alaska Sup. Ct. Order 5 (1960). 
 64. Then Chief Justice Rabinowitz strongly dissented to the revisions, finding no 
compelling justification for the changes.  Alaska Sup. Ct. Order 1118 (July 15, 1983).  
Chief Justice Rabinowitz further expressed concern that the amendment would have a 
negative effect on civil litigation: 
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what had already been a general practice in the courts—the discretionary 
altering of the fee awards to advance public policy concerns. 
The modified Rule does not explicitly mention public interest liti-
gants nor does it spell out the four-part public interest criteria laid out in 
McCabe and Kenai Lumber.  However, subsections I and K state as ex-
ceptions to the general fee-shifting rule the same rationale that the court 
considered in McCabe—that the fee schedule may need to be altered so 
as not to make the option of litigation financially prohibitive to some po-
tential litigants. 
Since the enactment of Supreme Court Order 1118, the supreme 
court has, on one notable occasion, referenced section b(3) in connection 
with the public interest exception.  In Dansereau v. Ulmer,65 the su-
preme court used section b(3) as authority for invoking the public inter-
est litigant exception.66  The case involved a voter challenge to the 1994 
gubernatorial election, charging three violations of state election laws.67  
The plaintiffs prevailed on one of three claims and agreed with the de-
fendant that the superior court would act as an arbiter to determine attor-
ney’s fees “under the public interest exception to Civil Rule 82 or under 
Civil Rule 82(b)(3).”68  Because the plaintiffs prevailed on only one of 
three issues, they were awarded fees substantially less than the full fees 
they had requested and appealed.69  The supreme court held that the su-
perior court abused its discretion because public interest litigants were 
entitled to full attorney’s fees awards on all public interest issues 
whether or not they prevailed on those claims.70  In coming to this de-
termination, the court cited Rule 82(b)(3)(K) as the authority for the 
court to deviate from the general attorney’s fees rule and to grant an ex-
ception for the public interest litigant in this case.71  Dansereau has been 
 
[M]y judicial hunch is that these amendments to Civil Rule 82, in particular the 
new provisions reflected in (b)(3)(A) through (K), will unnecessarily and dra-
matically increase litigation over attorney’s fees awards both in our trial courts 
as well as in this court. . . . I further note that our Civil Rules Committee re-
cently surveyed the Alaska Bar membership on discrete aspects of Civil Rule 
82.  A clear majority of those responding to the committee’s questionnaire in-
dicated: that Civil Rule 82 does not deter people of moderate means from fil-
ing valid claims; that the rule does not put excessive pressure on moderate in-
come people to settle valid claims; and that the rule is needed to discourage 
frivolous litigation. 
Id.  Chief Justice Rabinowitz entered his objection into the rule as a matter of record.  Id. 
 65. 955 P.2d 916 (Alaska 1998). 
 66. Id. at 918–19. 
 67. Id. at 917. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 918. 
 70. Id. at 920.  The court further noted that this entitlement to full attorney’s fees on 
public interest claims may be departed from only in exceptional circumstances.  Id. 
 71. Id. at 919. 
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cited for its precedent relating to the public interest exception in several 
subsequent opinions.72 
While subsections I and K do not codify the public interest excep-
tion, they do codify the court’s discretion to depart from the general rule 
to consider policy rationales similar to those that shaped the public inter-
est exception.  Furthermore, the Dansereau decision indicates the court’s 
acknowledgement of section b(3) as authority for the public interest ex-
ception. 
III.  HOUSE BILL 145 
On September 11, 2003, House Bill 145 was adopted as law, re-
pealing and reenacting the public interest litigant exception as estab-
lished by the supreme court.  The bill was proposed in response to the 
adverse effects that court interpretation of the doctrine had on state re-
source development projects.  For years, legislators had considered 
eliminating the exception for public interest litigants altogether to level 
the playing field of all litigation.  However, further review of the legisla-
tive committee hearings reveal that the main impetus behind the legisla-
tion was to reverse the effects of the public interest litigant exception on 
what was believed to be a judicial impediment to environmental agency 
policies.  The bill underwent many dramatic changes and revisions, most 
notably regarding the constitutionality of amending a civil procedure 
rule via a simple majority in the Alaska Legislature.  The following dis-
cussion illustrates the development of House Bill 145, the fruition of 
years of legislative debate on the judicial effects of the public interest 
litigant exception. 
A. Legislative History 
1. Previous legislative attempts to repeal the public interest liti-
gant doctrine.  House Bill 145 is not the first time the Alaska Legislature 
considered repealing the public interest litigant exception.  The common 
law doctrine has been a source of controversy and discussion within the 
state government for several years.  In March 1999, Senate Bill 123 was 
introduced to amend the public interest litigant exception.73  Senate Bill 
123 would have added subsection b(3)(g) to the Rule to read as follows: 
 
 72. See, e.g., Cizek v. Concerned Citizens of Eagle River Valley, Inc., 71 P.3d 845, 
852 (Alaska 2003); Diaz v. Silver Bay Logging, Inc., 55 P.3d 732, 737 (Alaska 2002); 
Metanuska Elec. Ass’n v. Rewire the Board, 36 P.3d 685, 696 (Alaska 2001); Laverty v. 
State R.R. Corp. 13 P.3d 725, 738 (Alaska 2000). 
 73. S.J. 21, 1st Sess., at 701 (Alaska 1999). 
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Attorney’s fees shall be awarded to or against a public interest litigant 
in the same manner as attorney’s fees may be awarded to or against a 
non-public interest litigant under (b) of this section.74 
The proposed bill amendment permitted a narrow exception for public 
interest litigants to recover attorney’s fees only under “exceptional cir-
cumstances.”75  Interestingly, the proposal noted that the bill could only 
take effect if passed by a two-thirds majority vote in both houses, as re-
quired by Article IV, Section 15 of the Alaska Constitution.76  Senate 
Bill 123 was passed in the state senate 14-5, with one abstention.77  The 
bill was brought to the attention of the house in March 2000, but no ac-
tion was taken before the close of the session.78 
In the next legislative session, the state senate reconsidered Senate 
Bill 183 under the same title.79  Senate Bill 183 was identical to Senate 
Bill 123, which had passed in March 2000, and the amended court rules 
passed 12-8 in the state senate.80  The bill was introduced in the house in 
April 2001.81  In the House Judiciary Committee hearings, proponents of 
the amendment expressed concern over the use of the public interest ex-
ception in the wake of the court’s decision in Dansereau v. Ulmer.82  
According to one presenter, the Dansereau decision was problematic in 
that it would promote “spurious lawsuits, since plaintiffs know they will 
receive compensation for all costs even if they only win on one or sev-
eral of the points that they brought up at suit.”83 
An opponent to the proposed bill argued that Senate Bill 183 would 
effectively eliminate the ability of an ordinary person to legally defend 
his or her constitutional rights under the law.84  Representative Ogan ac-
knowledged this concern but noted this legislation was aimed at those 
organizations that continually use state resources via the public interest 
 
 74. S.B. 123, 21st Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1999). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. S.J. 21, 2d Sess., at 2479 (Alaska 2000). 
 78. An Act relating to public interest litigants and to attorney fees; amending Rule 
82, Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure: Hearing on S.B. 123 Before the House Judiciary 
Comm., 21st Leg., 2d Sess., at 2480 (Alaska 2000) (scheduled hearing by House Judici-
ary Comm.). 
 79. S.B. 183, 22d Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2001). 
 80. S.J. 22, 1st Sess., at 1286 (Alaska 2001). 
 81. H.J. 22, 1st Sess., at 1296 (Alaska 2001). 
 82. An Act relating to public interest litigants and to attorney fees; amending Rule 
82, Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure: Hearing on S.B. 183 Before the House Judiciary 
Comm., 22d Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2001) (statement of Bill Church, Staff to Senator 
Dave Donley, Alaska State Leg.). 
 83. Id. 
 84. See, e.g., id. (statement of Dale Bondourant, Alaska Constitutional Legal De-
fense Conservation Fund). 
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exception to raise tremendous amounts of money for their national 
causes.85  A representative from an environmental non-profit organiza-
tion concurred with this concern regarding well-funded national organi-
zations but distinguished his group as an example of those organizations 
whose litigation serves the public’s interest, not their organization’s, and 
on whom Senate Bill 183 would have a chilling effect.86  Several other 
opponents of the bill argued that it was overbroad and failed in its target-
ing of wealthy non-profit organizations.87  By eliminating the exception 
for all public interest litigants, the amendment would in fact effectively 
eliminate public interest lawsuits except for those wealthy organizations 
the bill was intended to target.88  Advocates also expressed concern that 
the bill did not receive sufficient public input and was being rushed 
through the legislature.89  They further warned that a bill of this nature 
would be challenged on constitutional grounds.90 
Perhaps the most insightful criticism of the bill came from the Dis-
ability Law Center of Alaska (DLC).  DLC argued that it was unneces-
sary to pass such an overbroad bill to prevent frivolous litigation because 
sanctions against bad faith and vexatious claims already existed in Rule 
82, even for public interest litigants.91  DLC’s representative advocated 
that the Dansereau holding should stand as is.  He stated that the pro-
posed bill would further encumber and discourage public interest liti-
gants by forcing them to litigate both on the merits of their cases and 
over which parties won by a greater margin on the several issues upon 
which they prevailed.92  He further noted that not all public interest liti-
gation cases involved money awards.93  The proposed bill, it was con-
tended, would strongly dissuade potential litigants who sought judicial 
 
 85. Id.  (statement of Rep. Scott Ogan, Member, House Judiciary Comm.) (referenc-
ing Greenpeace as an example).  Other such organizations mentioned included Trustees 
for Alaska, Earth Justice, and the Sierra Club.  Id. (statement of Pam LaBolle, President, 
Alaska State Chamber of Commerce). 
 86. Id. (statement of Dale Bondourant). 
 87. Mr. Bondourant argued that large, well-funded organizations would still have 
the economic incentive and resources to challenge state laws and regulations.  Id.  In 
subsequent hearings, it was proffered that such a bill might actually aid national fund-
raising efforts as evidence that the organizations were successfully frustrating state re-
source development projects.  Id. (statement of Robert Briggs, Staff Attorney, Disability 
Law Center of Alaska). 
 88. Id. (statement of Robin Smith). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. (statement of Robert Briggs). 
 92. See id. 
 93. Id. 
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remedy for issues where non-monetary claims were at stake.94  Many of 
these potential litigants, he noted, are poor and would not otherwise 
bring forth good faith, meritorious claims, if told that they would be ex-
pected to pay part of the opponent’s fees should they lose.95  Throughout 
the hearing, there was concern that the bill would create a huge injus-
tice.96  Ultimately, the bill was moved to the Rules Committee and was 
not acted upon before the legislative session expired.97 
2. Legislative history of House Bill 145.  On June 13, 2003, Gov-
ernor Murkowski signed House Bill 145, purporting to repeal the public 
interest litigant exception to Rule 82.98  House Bill 145 is the latest in the 
series of attempts to eliminate the public interest litigant exception.  
Unlike the previous two attempts, House Bill 145 was introduced at the 
executive level.  The bill was first introduced to the legislature by the 
governor in March 2003 to address the problem of public interest groups 
impeding the state from developing its resources.99  Murkowski’s pro-
posal argued that the present exception for public interest litigants “cre-
ates several undesirable incentives when decisions of the state are called 
into question.”100  In particular, he was concerned with the affirmative 
incentive of well-financed groups to overturn state resource development 
decisions with doubtful claims because they could win large awards 
without the countervailing risk of fees being awarded against them.101  
Therefore, his proposal called for the abolishment of the common law 
public interest exception in that narrow set of cases.102 
At the outset of the House Judiciary Committee hearings, it was 
clear that House Bill 145 was intended to target a more limited set of 
circumstances than Senate Bill 183, which passed in the Senate during 
 
 94. Id.  Mr. Briggs cited as examples of such non-monetary claims: “the question of 
when human life should be recognized; the parameters of religious practice and belief; or 
the limits of science and medicine and dealing with human cells or tissue, genetic, or 
health information.” Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. (statement by Rep. Ethan Berkowitz, Member, House Judiciary Comm.). 
 97. S.J. 22, 2d Sess., at 3280 (Alaska 2002). 
 98. H.J. 23, 1st Sess., at 2224 (Alaska 2003). 
 99. H.J. 23, 1st Sess., at 359 (Alaska 2003). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id.  The letter narrowly requests that the public interest exception be abolished 
for “[those] cases contesting decisions by the Department of Environmental Conserva-
tion, the Department of Fish and Game, or the Department of Natural Resources making 
a coastal consistency determination, adopting regulations, or in which the public had an 
opportunity to comment to the agency and seek administrative review before the 
agency.”  Id. 
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the prior legislative session.103  The original proposed amended section 
b(3)(g) referred only to claims against a limited range of administrative 
decisions.104  It read as follows: 
In a civil action contesting a decision of the Department of Environ-
mental Conservation, the Department of Fish and Game, or the De-
partment of Natural Resources making a coastal consistency determi-
nation, adopting regulations, or for which there was an opportunity 
for the public to comment to the agency before the final agency deci-
sion and to seek administrative review before the agency following 
the initial agency decision, attorney’s fees may only be awarded to or 
against a public interest litigant in the same manner as attorney’s fees 
may be awarded to or against a non-public interest litigant under (b) 
of this rule.105 
The Attorney General’s office made the case that legal actions in these 
situations did not require additional judicial deference because the ac-
tions were in response to administrative decisions in which there had al-
ready been extensive public participation.106  Assistant Attorney General 
Tillery proffered that such a bill would “balance the incentives  in  litiga-
tion  between  those  who  attack  a  state resource  agency  decision  and  
those  who  would  defend  it,” thereby eliminating any disadvantage.107 
The most noteworthy contribution from the Attorney General’s of-
fice was a proposal to discard subsection (g) and all reference to amend-
ing the civil rule and alternatively add changes to Alaska Statutes section 
09.060.010, the corresponding enabling statute of Rule 82.108  The ra-
tionale for this proposal was to bypass the supermajority vote needed to 
change Rule 82(b) and simply proceed as a change in statute.109  Repre-
sentative Gruenberg raised doubts about the constitutionality of passing 
House Bill 145 without a supermajority vote in both houses.110  How-
ever, a representative from the Alaska Chamber of Commerce believed 
 
 103. An Act relating to public interest litigants and to attorney fees; amending Rule 
82, Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure: Hearing on H.B. 145 Before the House Judiciary 
Comm., 23 Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2003) [hereinafter “H.B. 145 House Judiciary Comm. 
Hearings”] (statement of Craig Tillery, Assistant Attorney General, Envtl. Section, Civil 
Div., Dep’t. of Law). 
 104. See H.B. 145, 23d Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2003) (version A). 
 105. Id. 
 106. H.B. 145 House Judiciary Comm. Hearings, supra note 103, (statement of Craig 
Tillery). 
 107. Id.  Mr. Tillery did not appear in favor of eliminating the public interest litigant 
exception altogether and further proposed to codify the four-part public interest test of 
McCabe and Kenai within the rules as a definitional term for “public interest litigant.” 
See id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. (statement of Rep. Max Gruenberg, Member, House Judiciary Comm.). 
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that the opening language of the Rule itself (“[e]xcept as otherwise pro-
vided by law”)111 provided legislative authority to effect a change in 
Rule 82 without a formal court rule change because the Rule was subject 
to contrary language in other sources of law, such as statutes.112  No le-
gal precedent or commentary was offered in support of this interpreta-
tion of the clause nor was there support for the suggestion that statutes 
may supercede court-enacted civil rules, which normally fall under the 
authority of the supreme court.113 
The first two days of hearings proceeded using the proposed rule as 
limited to environmental decisions.114  Although the limited scope of the 
new bill raised fewer objections, some legislators were still concerned 
about endangering the availability of an effective check on the govern-
ment with respect to environmental agency decisions.115  A representa-
tive from the Alaska Chamber of Commerce suggested that subpara-
graphs I and K could, in those situations, be used as an alternative to a 
blanket public interest litigant exception.116  It was questioned to what 
extent these subsections had been effectively used for public interest 
means in the past.117  In response, it was asserted that, with the availabil-
ity of the common law public interest exception, there has rarely been a 
need to rely on those provisions.118 
In general, many advocates of this version of the bill recognized the 
value of the public interest litigant exception.  Thus, they wished to keep 
the exception intact for other claims outside the scope of environmental 
agency challenges.119  Even some organizations that had objected to past 
broader versions of the bill found this version less objectionable.120  The 
compromises of this version were more palatable to some organizations 
because of the extreme financial pressures on the legislature and state 
 
 111. ALASKA CIV. R. 82 
 112. H.B. 145 House Judiciary Comm. Hearings, supra note 103 (statement of Ben-
jamin Brown, Legis. Assistant, Alaska State Chamber of Commerce). 
 113. See id.  Mr. Brown further noted that the Alaska Chamber of Commerce sup-
ported a “very, very limited” abrogation of the public interest litigant doctrine to the nar-
row cases involving administrative decisions of the several named environmental agen-
cies and supported the preservation of the public interest litigant exception otherwise.  
Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See, e.g., id. (statement of Rep. Les Gara, Member, House Judiciary Comm.). 
 116. Id. (statement of Benjamin Brown). 
 117. Id. (statement of Rep. Les Gara). 
 118. Id.  (statement of Rep. Lesil McGuire, Chair, House Judiciary Comm.). 
 119. See, e.g., id. (statement of Robert Briggs, Staff Attorney, Disability Law Center 
of Alaska). 
 120. Mr. Briggs, who had for several years advocated against bills aimed at eliminat-
ing the public interest exception, did not raise a formal objection to the bill as applied 
only to environmental agency decisions.  Id. 
112904 ZANZI.DOC 12/9/2004  11:51 AM 
2004] PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGANT DOCTRINE 343 
fiscal system and the benefit of resource development to the State, in-
cluding general fund revenues it produces for all native Alaskans.121  
Even so, Representative Gara and several others expressed concern.  In 
light of previous legislative attempts to eliminate the public interest liti-
gation exception altogether, they argued that there should be further 
safeguards to protect the exception as it applied to plaintiffs outside the 
scope of House Bill 145.122 
The bill was subsequently moved to the House Finance Committee 
for review, where it encountered the most dramatic changes.123  A 
Committee Substitute was drafted for approval, severely broadening the 
scope of House Bill 145.124  The Committee Substitute did three major 
things: it (1) eliminated the public interest litigant doctrine; (2) reenacted 
a more limited form of the doctrine for constitutional claims; and (3) 
proactively asserted its constitutionality under Article IV, Section 15 of 
the Alaska Constitution.125  Concern was expressed that the bill was in-
troduced too late in the deliberations without prior notice.126 
The amended version appeared to garner more support than past 
versions; however, many objections were raised to the substantive 
changes and the far-reaching effect of the new draft proposal.127  In the 
Senate Finance Committee hearings, it was argued that because of the 
late introduction of the substantive changes, the legislature had primarily 
heard testimony with regard to the bill’s effect on state resource devel-
opment.128  Very little testimony, however, was presented regarding the 
bill’s broader impact on public interest litigation.129  Aside from testi-
mony from the DLC, no discussion was given as to whether the bill vio-
lated article IV, section 15 of the state constitution for attempting to en-
act a rule of civil procedure via legislation without a supermajority 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. The proposed addition read: 
Nothing in this section shall prohibit the court from awarding a successful public interest 
litigant costs and reasonable attorney’s fees or refusing to award any costs or attorney’s 
fees against an unsuccessful public interest litigant if the court determines that such an  
order is warranted under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82(b)(3). 
Id.  The Judiciary Committee voted 2-5 against the amendment.  Id. 
 123. H.J. 23, 1st Sess., at 1450 (Alaska 2003). 
 124. See H.B. 145, 23d Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2003) (version C). 
 125. See An Act relating to public interest litigants and to attorney fees; amending 
Rule 82, Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure: Hearing on H.B. 145 Before the House Fi-
nance Comm., 23 Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2003) [hereinafter “H.B. 145 House Finance 
Comm. Hearings”]. 
 126. Id. (statement of Rep. Ethan Berkowitz). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. (statement of Robert Briggs). 
 129. See id. 
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vote.130  After passing by a supermajority in the house, the bill passed 
with minor revisions in the senate by a vote of 12-8.131 
B. House Bill 145: Provisions and Implications 
House Bill 145 was adopted as an amendment to Alaska Statutes 
section 09.060.010 and became effective on September 11, 2003.132  The 
statute was a procedurally flawed attempt to eliminate the public interest 
litigant doctrine as created by the Supreme Court of Alaska.133  The stat-
ute was a result of legislative attempts to reconcile the two main compet-
ing concerns raised in the committee hearings: (1) that the public interest 
litigant doctrine unfairly benefits public interest litigants and overbur-
dens state resource development, and (2) that without the exception, 
there is a disincentive for private litigants to bring non-economic public 
interest claims to court. 
House Bill 145 overtly overturned the four-part public interest liti-
gant test established in Alaska case law.134  This was very controversial 
because it removed any discretion for the court to alter the fee-shifting 
schedule on the basis of the public interest nature of the claim even 
 
 130. See id. 
 131. S.J. 23, 1st Sess., at 1653 (Alaska 2003). 
 132. H.J. 23, 1st Sess., at 2224 (Alaska 2003). 
 133. House Bill 145 expressly stated that its purpose was to overturn the case law 
pertaining to the public interest litigant doctrine: 
PURPOSE.  (a)  The judicially created doctrine respecting the award of attorney fees and 
costs for or against public interest litigants has created an unbalanced set of incentives 
for parties litigating issues that fall under the public interest litigant exception.  This im-
balance has led to increased litigation, arguments made with little merit, difficulties in 
compromising claims, and significant costs to the state and private citizens.  More im-
portantly, application of the public interest litigant exception has resulted in unequal ac-
cess to the courts and unequal positions in litigation. 
(b)  The purpose of sec. 2 of this Act to [sic] provide for a more equal footing for parties 
in civil action and appeals by abrogating the special status given to public interest liti-
gants with respect to the award of attorney fees and costs.  It is the intent of the legisla-
ture to expressly overrule the decisions of the Alaska Supreme Court .  .  . insofar as they 
relate to the award of attorney fees and costs to or against public interest litigants in fu-
ture civil actions and appeals. 
Act of Sept. 11, 2003, Ch. 86, § 1, 2003 Alaska Sess. Laws 168, 168 (Lexis).  The stat-
ute mentioned specific cases including Dansereau v. Ulmer, 955 P.2d 916 (Alaska 1998), 
McCabe v. Anchorage, 568 P.2d 986 (Alaska 1977), Gilbert v. State, 526 P.2d 1131 
(Alaska 1974), and their progeny as they relate to the award of attorney’s fees.  Id. 
 134. Section 2 (b) read: 
Except as otherwise provided by statute, a court in this state may not discriminate in the 
award of attorney fees and costs to or against a party in a civil action or appeal based on 
the nature of the policy or interest advocated by the party, the number of persons af-
fected by the outcome of the case, whether a governmental entity could be expected to 
bring or participate in the case, the extent of the party’s economic incentive to bring the 
case, or any combination of these factors. 
Id. §2. 
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though the trend in subsequent revisions to Rule 82 has only been to 
strengthen, not weaken, a court’s discretion to alter the fee award for 
public interest considerations.135  The authority for the legislature to 
trump the court’s jurisdictional powers in this way is questionable.  Cu-
riously, the statute did not address the court’s authority to alter a fee 
award under the Rule 82(b)(3) factors or the extent to which those fac-
tors, specifically I and K, embody public interest rationales.  This would 
have left open the opportunity for the court to justify departing from the 
general rule for public interest litigants for reasons other than the four-
part common law test. 
In the absence of the judicially created public interest litigant doc-
trine, House Bill 145 preserved a two-way exception to Rule 82 in a nar-
row set of cases with constitutional claims.136  It both enabled prevailing 
claimants to receive full attorney’s fees and provided immunity from ad-
verse fee awards on non-prevailing constitutional claims.137  By limiting 
the exception to constitutional claims, the statute ignored the wide ambit 
of public interest claims that do not arise out of a grievance under the 
state or federal constitutions, but which do pass muster under the court’s 
stringent four-part test.  Such claims often arise in cases involving elec-
tion law, environmental law, education law, and disability law. 
House Bill 145 dealt specifically with the court’s holding in Dan-
sereau v. Ulmer by limiting fee award exceptions to prevailing constitu-
tional claims only.138  The statute authorized the court to exempt defen-
 
 135. See supra Part II. B. 
 136. Section 2 (c) read: 
In a civil action or appeal concerning the establishment, protection, or enforcement of a 
right under the United States Constitution or the Constitution of the State of Alaska, the 
court 
(1)  shall award, subject to (d) and (e) of this section, full reasonable attorney fees 
and costs to a claimant, who, as plaintiff, counterclaimant, cross-claimant, or third-
party plaintiff in the action or on appeal, has prevailed in asserting the right; 
(2)  may not order a claimant to pay the attorney fees of the opposing party devoted 
to claims concerning constitutional rights if the claimant as plaintiff, counterclaim-
ant, crossclaimant, or third-party plaintiff in the action or appeal did not prevail in 
asserting the right, the action or appeal asserting the right was not frivolous, and 
the claimant did not have sufficient economic incentive to bring the action or ap-
peal regardless of the constitutional claims involved. 
Act of Sept. 11, 2003, Ch. 86, § 2, 2003 Alaska Sess. Laws at 169. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Sections 2 (d) and 2 (e) read: 
(d)  In calculating an award of attorney fees and costs under (c)(1) of this section, 
(1)  the court shall include in the award only that portion of the services of claim-
ant’s attorney fees and associated costs that were devoted to claims concerning 
rights under the United States Constitution or the Constitution of the State of 
Alaska upon which the claimant ultimately prevailed; and 
(2)  the court shall make an award only if the claimant did not have sufficient eco-
nomic incentive to bring the suit, regardless of the constitutional claims involved. 
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dants from paying attorney’s fees when they have lost a constitutional 
claim either if such an award would create undue hardship or if the party 
is a public entity supported by public tax revenue.139  Most significantly, 
this would have enabled courts to relieve state and federal agencies from 
paying attorney’s fees to prevailing litigants.140  These provisions dem-
onstrate the legislature’s attempts to dictate the outcome of judicial in-
quiry under Rule 82, when discretional authority is properly allocated to 
the court. 
IV. NATIVE VILLAGE OF NUNAPITCHUK V. STATE 
In April 2004, the Superior Court in Juneau, in Native Village of 
Nunapitchuk v. State, struck down House Bill 145 for failing to fulfill 
the constitutionally required supermajority vote of both houses to amend 
a court rule.141  In Nunapitchuk, a group of non-profit organizations, rep-
resenting, among others, native tribal and environmental interests, chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the bill for violating the rule-making au-
thority provisions of the state constitution.142  Superior Court Judge 
Patricia Collins tackled the difficult question of whether the award of at-
torney’s fees is under the procedural jurisdiction of the judiciary or the 
substantive jurisdiction of the legislature.143  Judge Collins acknowl-
edged several supreme court decisions that defined attorney’s fees 
awards as an equitable power of the court, but determined that these 
mere declarations did not provide a clear answer to the substantive ver-
sus procedural question.144 
In addressing the substantive versus procedural distinction, Judge 
Collins concluded that there is no bright-line rule.145  Finding little guid-
ance in the Alaska common law precedent, Judge Collins consulted a 
broad range of authority, including the New Jersey Constitution, which 
was used as a model for the rule-making clause of the Alaska Constitu-
tion.146  She specifically noted New Jersey case law, holding that attor-
 
(e)  The court, in its discretion, may abate, in full or in part, an award of attorney fees 
and costs otherwise payable under (c) and (d) of this section if the court finds, based 
upon sworn affidavits or testimony, that the full imposition of the award would inflict a 
substantial and undue hardship upon the party ordered to pay the fees and costs or, if the 
party is a public entity, upon the taxpaying constituents of the public entity. 
Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. No. 1JU-03-700 CI, slip op. at 3 (Alaska Super. Ct.  Apr. 6,  2004). 
 142. Id. at 1–2.  Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the bill violated their due 
process and equal protection rights.  Id.  These issues are beyond the scope of this Note. 
 143. Id. at 13. 
 144. Id. at 14. 
 145. Id. at 15. 
 146. Id. at 18. 
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ney’s fees and costs were within the scope of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court’s rule-making authority.147  Judge Collins also appeared to rely 
heavily on a Michigan study examining state constitutional revisions, 
which suggested that “how costs should be taxed” is a question for the 
courts and that “the amount of costs that should be taxed” is a question 
for the legislature.148  Admitting that the variety of sources consulted 
provided no definitive answer, she concluded that the award of attor-
ney’s fees is procedural in nature.149  On the more difficult issue of 
whether the public interest litigant doctrine is procedural or substantive, 
Judge Collins again sided with the plaintiffs, holding that the doctrine is 
a procedural rule separate from the general fee-shifting schedule.150  Ul-
timately, Judge Collins rested her conclusions on the equitable discre-
tionary powers granted by the rule.151 
V.  CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF HOUSE BILL 145 
As Governor Murkowski stated, House Bill 145 set out to “change 
the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure.”152  Even though the legislature 
recognized at the outset that the bill required a supermajority vote in 
both houses, the legislation presupposed its constitutionality by purport-
ing to amend substantive law by a simple majority vote.  In Nunapti-
chuk, Judge Collins correctly concluded that House Bill 145 was uncon-
stitutional, but understated the clarity and weight of legal precedent that 
prohibits the way in which the bill was passed.  Rather, the boundaries 
that delineate the powers of the legislature and judiciary are more explic-
itly defined in the constitution than Judge Collins suggests, and the dis-
tinction between substantive and procedural law has been more defini-
tively established in the common law than she observed.  Whether or not 
the statute survives, this legal battle raises these important constitutional 
issues.  A more comprehensive analysis of the existing law is therefore 
demanded. 
 
 147. Id. at 19 (quoting Du-Wel Prods., Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 565 A.2d 1113 (N. J. 
Super. 1990)). 
 148. Id. at 20. 
 149. Id. at 22. 
 150. Id. at 24. 
 151. Id. 
 152. H.J. 23, 1st Sess., at 360 (Alaska 2003). 
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A. The Alaska Constitution Clearly Delineates the Rule-making Pow-
ers of the Legislative and Judicial Branches of the State Govern-
ment 
Article IV of the Alaska Constitution provides clear guidelines for 
the establishment and amendment of rules of civil procedure by vesting 
rule-making authority in the Supreme Court of Alaska: 
The supreme court shall make and promulgate rules governing the 
administration of all courts.  It shall make and promulgate rules gov-
erning practice and procedure in civil and criminal cases in all courts.  
These rules may be changed by the legislature by two-thirds vote of 
the members elected to each house.153 
Concurrently, article IV, section 1 vests the judicial power of the state in 
the courts.154  The supreme court has on many occasions commented on 
the scope and mechanics of article IV’s rule-making clause to define the 
boundaries between judicial and legislative authority.  In Thomas v. 
State,155 the court declared that, although the power to create substantive 
rights is a legislative power, the authority to enact procedures to imple-
ment those rights is judicial.156  In doing so, the court identified the ju-
risdictional balance between the legislature and the judiciary as a matter 
of substantive versus procedural law. 
There are times, however, when these branches of government may 
intrude upon the duties of each other.  Although courts may not legislate, 
the judiciary, by virtue of sections 1 and 15 of article IV, has both sub-
stantive and procedural rule-making authority.157  In Citizens’ Coalition 
for Tort Reform, Inc. v. McAlpine,158 the court held that, although purely 
substantive rules may not be allowed under section 15, the distinction 
between procedural and substantive rules is not dispositive for rules en-
acted under section 1.159  McAlpine involved the denial of certification of 
an initiative to cap attorney’s fees in personal injury cases by the lieu-
 
 153. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15. 
 154. Id. art. IV, § 1. 
 155. 566 P.2d 630 (Alaska 1977). 
 156. Id. at 637. 
 157. See Citizens’ Coalition for Tort Reform Inc. v. McAlpine, 810 P.2d 162, 165 
(Alaska 1991); see also Coghill v. Coghill, 836 P.2d 921 (Alaska 1992).  In Coghill, the 
court dealt with the constitutionality of a civil procedure rule that empowered the court 
to influence a matter of substantive law covered by statute.  Id. at 927.  Civil Rule 90(3) 
established guidelines to enable courts to determine child support awards, instituting a 
formula based on the income of the non-custodial parent.  Id.  Alaska Statutes section 
25.24.160 allowed for courts to set child support awards as may be “just and proper” for 
the parties.  Id.  The court held that Rule 90(3) did not violate the separation of powers 
doctrine by allowing the courts to exercise legislative powers because the rule merely 
interpreted and established guidelines within the statute.  Id. at 927–28. 
 158. 810 P.2d 162 (Alaska 1991). 
 159. Id. at 167 n.10. 
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tenant governor on the grounds that the initiative attempted to prescribe 
a rule of court.160  The court noted that it derived its broad rule-making 
authority under the two provisions of article IV and spoke to the differ-
ences between section 1 and section 15 rule-making authority.161  Rea-
soning that the authority to regulate the courts and the practice of law 
under section 1 “includes the authority to regulate with greater substan-
tive effect inside the limited ambit of the judicial system than . . . un-
der . . . article IV, section 15 powers,”162 the court held that limitations 
on attorney’s fees in personal injury cases were rules of court.163 
On the other hand, the constitution carefully limits when the legis-
lature may infringe on the court’s otherwise exclusive rule-making au-
thority by requiring a two-thirds vote rather than a simple majority to 
change rules of practice and procedure.164  The rationale for the super-
majority vote requirement is to prevent unintentional, hasty, and ill-
advised legislation that “would ultimately frustrate the sound purpose in 
giving courts the primary authority and responsibility for regulating their 
own affairs.”165  When the legislature does seek to amend court rules by 
a supermajority vote, the bill must specifically state its purpose to do 
so.166  Further, the legislature’s stated intentions are not dispositive in 
discerning whether it has attempted to prescribe a different procedure 
than that contained in a court rule.167 
 
 160. Id. at 163–64. 
 161. Id. at 164–65. 
 162. Id. at 167, n.10. 
 163. Id. at 167. 
 164. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15; see also Leege v. Martin, 379 P.2d 447, 450 
(Alaska 1963); City of Valdez v. Valdez Dev. Co., 506 P.2d 1279, 1283 (Alaska 1973).  
However, the court in Leege held that the judicial power to make rules of practice 
and procedure is not absolute and that “the legislature may change rules initiated 
by the judiciary when the desirability of making a change is evident, such as in a 
case where a particular rule of procedure may involve considerations of public 
policy that are better left to the legislature to pass upon.”  Leege, 379 P.2d at 450. 
 165. Leege, 379 P.2d at 450. 
 166. ALASKA UNIF. R. LEGIS. P. 39(e).  The rule reads, in relevant part: 
If a bill or portion of a bill contains matter changing a supreme court 
rule governing practice and procedure in civil or criminal cases, the bill 
must contain a section expressly citing the rule and noting what change is 
being proposed. The section containing the change in a court rule must be ap-
proved by an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the full membership of each 
house. If the section effecting a change in the court rule fails to receive the re-
quired two-thirds vote, the section is void and without effect and is deleted 
from the bill. The fact that a bill contains a section which changes a court rule 
shall also be noted in the title of the bill. 
Id.; see also Nolan v. Sea Airmotive, Inc., 627 P.2d 1035, 1047 (Alaska 1981). 
 167. Leege, 379 P.2d at 451. 
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If the supreme court finds House Bill 145 constitutional, the enact-
ment of this law presents troubling implications for the separation of 
powers within the Alaska government.  As observed similarly in Citi-
zens’ Coalition, any challenge to House Bill 145 will raise questions 
about whether a statutory limit on attorney’s fees preempts the court’s 
rule-making authority under the constitution.  The reasoning in Citizens’ 
Coalition is very much applicable here.  The authority and discretion to 
alter attorney’s fee awards is granted to the supreme court by virtue of 
Rule 82.168  An argument might be raised that in every other jurisdiction 
of the United States, attorney fee-shifting law is not a matter of court 
procedure and therefore not a rule within the judiciary’s primary author-
ity.  Such an assertion is inapposite here because Alaska’s unique fee-
shifting system is codified in the rules of civil procedure.  As such, the 
authority to make rules regarding attorney’s fees is under the jurisdiction 
of the court, excepting legislation by a supermajority vote. 
House Bill 145 undermined the authority of the court to effectuate 
the workings of the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure.  As exemplified in 
Citizens’ Coalition, the court’s rule-making authority is explicitly broad.  
Some might argue that even if the authority to alter fee awards in public 
interest cases is within the court’s rule-making authority, the court cre-
ated the public interest litigant exception merely as a common law doc-
trine, not as a section 15 rule of court; therefore House Bill 145 inter-
feres only where the court has spoken as a matter of substantive law.  
This contention fails on several grounds.  First, there is no precedent to 
suggest that courts may not prescribe rules of court through case law.  
Second, the legislature does not have the power to make rules, but only 
to change them by a supermajority vote in both houses.169  Therefore, if 
the public interest litigant doctrine is considered a “rule” within the 
scope of Civil Rule 82, the legislature had no constitutional authority to 
pass House Bill 145 regardless of whether the court invoked its section 
15 rule-making authority to create the public interest litigant doctrine. 
B. The Distinction between Substantive and Procedural Laws is Well-
established in Alaska 
Ultimately, the issue of where the authority lies to create and amend 
the public interest litigant doctrine depends on whether the doctrine is a 
matter of substantive or procedural law.  The supreme court has held that 
substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights, while procedural 
law prescribes the method for enforcing those rights.170  In Channel Fly-
 
 168. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(3). 
 169. Channel Flying, Inc. v. Bernhardt, 451 P.2d 570, 575 (Alaska 1969) (citing 
ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15). 
 170. See, e.g., id. at 576.; Nolan, 627 P.2d at 1042. 
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ing, Inc., the court upheld a statute that provided for the peremptory dis-
qualification of a judge because it defined and created a substantive right 
to have a fair trial before an impartial judge.171  However, the supreme 
court struck down a statute for prescribing procedural law in Nolan v. 
Sea Airmotive, Inc.172  Nolan involved a constitutional challenge to leg-
islation amending class action procedure under the Alaska Wage and 
Hour Act by requiring class members to be specifically named in order 
to toll the statute of limitations.173  In defense of the statute, the defen-
dants argued that the legislation was closely associated with the creation 
of substantive rights because it sought to require individualized satisfac-
tion of the statute of limitations period in class action suits.174  The court 
was unconvinced by this argument and struck down the statute for con-
flicting with Civil Rule 23’s statute of limitations procedure.175  The 
court explained that the statute was procedural because the commence-
ment of an action is a procedural matter within the court’s policy objec-
tive of promoting efficiency.176  The court further noted that the statute’s 
failure to affect was procedural because the plaintiff’s cause of action 
reinforced the procedural nature of the statute.177 
Civil Rule 93 confirms the supremacy of court-promulgated rules 
by stating that “to the extent that [the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure] 
are inconsistent with any procedural provisions of any statute not en-
acted for the specific purpose of changing a rule, [they] shall supersede 
such statute to the extent of such inconsistency.”178  To this end, the 
court has established a three-part inquiry in order to invalidate a statute 
as procedural.  First, the court must find that the statute indeed conflicts 
with a rule promulgated by the court.179  Second, the statute must have 
more than merely an incidental effect on procedure.180  Finally, a statute 
that seeks to change a procedural rule will be invalidated if it does not 
explicitly state its purpose.181 
In most states, attorney fee-shifting is a matter of substantive law 
because state and federal statutes governing attorney’s fees create and 
define rights in litigation.  In Alaska, attorney’s fees are a matter of civil 
 
 171. Channel Flying, Inc., 451 P.2d at 576. 
 172. Nolan, 627 P.2d at 1047. 
 173. Id. at 1040. 
 174. Id. at 1045. 
 175. Id. at 1046. 
 176. Id. at 1045. 
 177. Id. at 1046. 
 178. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 93. 
 179. Winegardner v. Greater Anchorage Area Borough, 534 P.2d 541, 545 (Alaska 
1975). 
 180. Id. at 547. 
 181. Leege v. Martin, 379 P.2d 447, 451 (Alaska 1963). 
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procedure; therefore, it intuitively follows that the public interest litigant 
exception to the general fee-shifting rule is a matter of procedural law in 
Alaska.  Case law supports the assertion that House Bill 145 amended 
court procedure.  Similar to the challenged statute in Nolan, House Bill 
145 sought to amend a procedure of Alaskan civil litigation.  A propo-
nent of House Bill 145’s legality might contend that the statute defines 
the litigants’ substantive rights to attorney’s fees based on the nature of 
their claims.  This argument is a legal fiction because attorney’s fees in 
Alaska are not “rights” but procedural matters relating to the administra-
tion and functioning of the court system.  Although Rule 82 is an oft-
litigated rule, causes of action in these cases arise from an alleged abuse 
of discretion in fee awards, not from a substantive right granted by legis-
lation. 
In order to further test whether House Bill 145 should have been 
invalidated as procedural, it is necessary to apply the three-part common 
law inquiry discussed above.  The first question asks whether the legisla-
tion conflicts with a court-promulgated rule.  House Bill 145 does this in 
two ways.  First, it abrogates the court’s discretional authority to alter 
fee awards under factors I and K of section b(3) of Rule 82.  Second, 
House Bill 145 directly conflicts with the court’s establishment of the 
public interest litigant exception to the extent that the exception may be 
considered a legitimate court rule.  The next question asks whether the 
main subject of the statute is substantive with only an incidental effect 
on procedure.  As discussed earlier, House Bill 145 deals with legal is-
sues that are primarily procedural.  The legislature expressly recognized 
this procedural nature in both House Bill 145 as initiated in previous 
years and as introduced in past years.  The final product affects the same 
aspect of law (the judicial discretion to alter fee awards) as the original 
bill yet curiously assumes its constitutional validity.  The third question 
asks whether the legislature has changed the rule with the stated inten-
tion of doing so.  Per Rule 39 of the Uniform Rules of Alaska Legisla-
tive Procedure, the bill should have expressly cited the Rule it was 
changing and noted the proposed changes.  To the contrary, the legisla-
ture ignored these guidelines. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 
The supreme court should affirm the unconstitutionality of House 
Bill 145 on appeal in Nunapitchuk.  The issue before the court will be a 
compelling one because the court will be in a position to protect the doc-
trine it created and believed was necessary to avoid injustice in Alaska’s 
legal system.  Additionally, the court will be asked to determine the 
scope of its authority to make rules under the state constitution, an issue 
in which it is has a vested interest.  If it were to conclude that the public 
interest exception is substantive law under the primary jurisdiction of the 
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legislature, the court would undermine and limit its authority to interpret 
the civil rules.  Even if it does uphold the constitutionality of House Bill 
145, there is nothing to stop the court from exempting public interest liti-
gants under the authority of Rule 82(b)(3)(I) and (K).  If that is the case, 
then House Bill 145 will have failed to achieve its purpose of amending 
public interest litigation for non-constitutional claims. 
Although the constitutionality of House Bill 145 is uncertain, its 
passage publicizes the need for the court to address the competing public 
policy arguments concerning the public interest litigant doctrine.  The 
current public interest litigant exception and House Bill 145 both fail to 
adequately resolve these public policy concerns.  That is not to suggest 
that this is an easy task.  However, an evaluation of the inherent prob-
lems with each approach may reveal possible solutions. 
House Bill 145 was created out of concern that the public interest 
litigant exception shifted the balance excessively in favor of public in-
terest litigants.  The judicial fairness of the exception is a legitimate pub-
lic policy concern.  The possibility of an award for full attorney’s fees 
without any risk of adverse award creates an additional economic incen-
tive to litigate beyond obtaining a favorable judgment.  It encourages 
plaintiffs to bring unpromising public interest claims so long as they 
meet the minimum legal standard of merit.  When a plaintiff abuses this 
bias, it is unfair to a prevailing defendant who must pay the cost a weak 
claim.  This bias may make public interest claims coercive because of 
the certainty that defendants will have to pay—either their attorneys or 
both side’s attorneys—regardless of the outcome.  When the plaintiff is a 
large organization, there is an additional risk that public interest suits 
will be used as a fund-raising mechanism. 
On the other hand, contemporary legal theory suggests that immu-
nity from adverse fee awards is an essential safeguard for preserving 
public interest litigation incentives and access to the courts, particularly 
when the party is indigent and the claim is non-economic.  House Bill 
145 failed to account for the effect of such immunity on public interest 
litigants who bring non-constitutional claims.   
It is possible to accommodate concerns regarding fairness and ac-
cess to the courts in public interest litigation.  Regardless whether the 
supreme court declares House Bill 145 unconstitutional, the court or the 
legislature should consider revising the public interest litigant exception 
to preserve incentives to litigate and prevent incentives to fundraise.  
This can be accomplished by granting public interest litigants immunity 
from adverse awards in non-prevailing suits and granting only partial 
fees, according to the schedule in Rule 82, for prevailing claims.  Such a 
fee-shifting regime would deter large organizations from litigating 
claims with only a modicum of merit for the sole purpose of frustrating 
legitimate state actions.  Moreover, it would remove the incentive barrier 
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for indigent potential plaintiffs who have legitimate legal claims but lim-
ited resources to pursue them in court. 
Not all public interest litigants are equal; several situational factors 
influence their willingness to litigate.182  Public interest litigants may be 
differentiated into two categories: “one-shotters,” individuals who use 
the courts infrequently, and “repeat players,” which tend to be large, 
well-financed organizations.183  In general, the former class is considered 
more risk-averse than repeat players with respect to the economic incen-
tives of litigation.184  Likewise, not all public interest claims are equal.  
Some involve the potential for large punitive awards, while others in-
volve non-punitive claims.  The relative importance of the attorney’s 
fees is usually greater when the stakes are smaller or even non-
monetary; high fee awards can make a non-monetary or small claim 
prohibitively expensive.185 
All public interest claims, even good faith ones, have unpredictable 
results.  Given the uncertainties of litigation, an indigent public interest 
litigant challenging an environmental agency action may be effectively 
prohibited from using the courts by the risk of having to pay the win-
ner’s litigation costs.  Since litigation usually involves the assertion or 
establishment of legal rights, courts should be made accessible to every-
one.  Providing immunity from adverse fee awards for losing public in-
terest litigants ensures that individuals with lesser financial means will 
participate in the judicial system.  Removing their ability to get full fees 
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